

“New” Donors: A New Resource for Family Planning and Reproductive Health Financing?

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To learn more about changes in development assistance, look for our next research commentary, which will focus on the principles of “aid effectiveness,” including as country ownership, donor alignment with country priorities, and donor harmonization, as well as “new” methods of donor aid delivery including general budget and sector-wide support, and their implications on financing for family planning and reproductive health.

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While the past decades have seen a foreign aid field dominated by the world’s wealthy countries who are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC),¹ a new form a donorship has emerged, or more accurately, re-emerged. Aid funding from prosperous, yet still developing countries to other developing countries has drawn international attention, much of it from a critical perspective. A 2007 article in *Foreign Policy* labeled aid from China, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia as both “generous” and “toxic,”² while a recent cover of the *Economist* labeled China “The New Colonialists.”³ However, an increase in global aid to the poorest countries, delivered with fresh perspectives and an intensified spirit of South-South cooperation has many potential benefits.

While some donors and international observers criticize non-DAC aid for being overly influenced by economic or political interests, these and other important concerns apply to many DAC countries as well. A major shortcoming of the DAC donor community is lack of commitment to family planning and reproductive health. Nearly all donors fall short of the financial commitments made at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, where they pledged funding for family planning and reproductive health. Reproductive health care encompasses a range of issues, including family planning; STI and HIV prevention, care and treatment; and maternal and child health. An intense focus on HIV in the donor community has occurred alongside a significant decline in support for the other facets of reproductive health. The U.S., which is by far the largest provider of funds for family planning and reproductive health, has significantly cut funding for family planning, child survival, and maternal health, while dramatically increasing its funding for HIV/AIDS, and when adjusted for inflation, U.S. bilateral funding for family planning and reproductive health in 2007 was 41 percent less than in 1995.⁴ With such significant shortfalls, and such a great need for services, engaging new donors is an important opportunity.

This commentary will examine the current debate on the rise of “new” bilateral donors, the perceived threats to international aid effectiveness efforts, and possible benefits for poverty reduction and economic development, focusing on two major non-DAC donors, India and China. Finally, the commentary will offer recommendations on increasing the effectiveness of aid in these countries, and given the shortfalls in funding from DAC donors for family planning and reproductive health,



consider how funds from these “new” donors can help to support family planning and reproductive health in the developing world.

The Shape of International Aid

From the mid-1990s until the present, DAC countries have contributed at least 95 percent of overall international aid, with an average of 23 percent given through multilateral institutions.^{5 6} The DAC acts as a forum for these countries in their roles as bilateral donors, and is meant to facilitate donor cooperation and sharing of best practices, as well as increasing aid effectiveness.⁷ DAC countries have developed the dominant definitions, guidelines, and tracking mechanisms for development assistance, including efforts to increase aid harmonization. However, the DAC member states have by no means been the only sources of bilateral aid, and have not always had their current level of dominance.

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Prior to the 1990s, the donor field was significantly more diverse. The Soviet Union and Central European countries were active aid donors until the collapse of the USSR, when many became aid recipients themselves. Persian Gulf countries have administered large aid programs for decades, and at their height in 1978, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member contributions comprised 30 percent of all international aid. Further, many developing countries have contributed aid and technical assistance through a long history of South-South cooperation.⁸ For example, many Asian countries have provided development and humanitarian aid, particularly for their neighbors (e.g., India has long been a donor to neighboring Nepal and Bhutan), and technical assistance and training is commonly exchanged between developing countries.⁹ Many non-DAC donors participated in the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s which emphasized respect for sovereignty and non-interference, and are members of the G-77, which has criticized richer nations for using humanitarian assistance to further political ends.¹⁰ However, as some of these countries develop their own aid programs, many are facing the same criticisms.

Much like DAC members, non-DAC donors are a diverse group, with different geographical and thematic foci of aid giving, often reflecting political and economic interests or historical ties. The former Soviet Union provided aid to other communist nations (many of which, including Vietnam and Angola, still receive funding from former Soviet donor countries), frequently in the form of training and scholarships. Gulf States previously supported anti-Soviet countries and now focus on aid to predominantly Muslim developing countries in their own region and Africa. Giving is also influenced by security concerns, as China and South Korea give large amounts of aid to North Korea, Central European states have contributed to Balkan nations to support stability, and India has given significant aid to Nepal, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan to

support regional stability and counter the influence of neighboring Pakistan.¹¹ Venezuela is an important donor in the Caribbean and in some Latin American countries, while Brazil is active in the Lusophone commonwealth, including funding water programs in Angola.¹² The increased interest in foreign aid among non-DAC donors is particularly apparent in response to humanitarian crises: 16 countries pledged support for the Bosnian humanitarian crisis in 1994, while 92 pledged support to those affected by the Asian tsunami in 2005.¹³ Just a few weeks after Tropical Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar in May 2008, pledges of funding, in-kind donations, and response teams, came in from 22 non-DAC countries—the majority from Asia, but also from Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.¹⁴

In contrast, there is less emphasis on social development in non-DAC donorship, and very little evidence of significant non-DAC bilateral or multilateral aid for family planning and reproductive health. Turkey is an exception, providing \$4.26 million in 2006 for population and reproductive health activities, comprising 1.6 percent of their social infrastructure and services budget, and 0.67 percent of its overall bilateral assistance.¹⁵ South Korea—whose total 2007 official development aid (ODA) was US\$680 million—provided training for personnel from various regions in family planning and reproductive health, and is implementing an adolescent pregnancy prevention program in the Dominican Republic, with total support for population and family planning at \$541,000 from 2003 to 2006.^{16 17}

Aid Volumes

Assessing the non-DAC donor landscape is difficult, although it is certain that the contribution of non-DAC donors remains relatively low in comparison to that of DAC members, who contributed \$106.8 billion in ODA in 2005.¹⁸ DAC countries are required to have aid volumes either over US\$100 million, or an ODA to GNI ratio over 20 percent, as well as to provide annual required ODA statistics to the DAC, among other requirements.¹⁹ Some donors that are not members of the DAC still follow specific tracking guidelines set by the DAC and report their aid to the DAC's tracking mechanism, which shows that in 2005, 17 non-DAC countries reported \$3.2 billion in ODA. Non-DAC countries that are members of the OECD, such as South Korea— which is preparing to join the DAC in 2010— Turkey, and the Czech Republic, contributed \$1.9 billion, and Arab states gave \$0.7 billion . Many non-DAC donors operate very differently from the aid classification and reporting guidelines of the DAC, as well as other guidelines required for DAC membership, including China and India, some of the most important non-DAC donors.²⁰ This leads to conflicting estimates of these countries' giving. Manning estimates that China provides \$2 billion per year, and India provides \$1 billion, while the EU estimates that China contributes \$5 billion in development assistance per year, and India contributes \$100 million per year. Another observer considers these figures too conservative, and estimates India's aid at \$300 million annually .^{21 22 23} The structure of foreign aid programs in

many non-DAC countries further complicates tracking. Responsibilities for foreign aid are spread throughout various ministries, making it difficult to track expenditures, and many provide in-kind donations, which vary in valuation.²⁴

While aid of non-DAC countries is unlikely to surpass that of DAC donors and development banks in the foreseeable future,²⁵ non-DAC funding is likely to continue to rise for multiple reasons. New EU members that are not yet members of the DAC are increasing ODA to meet EU membership targets (they are attempting to reach targets of ODA as 0.17% of GNI by 2010, and 0.33% by 2015, although the size of their economies make their absolute contribution relatively small). Some non-DAC countries with large ODA programs, such as South Korea and Turkey, are expanding their programs further, as are some states with smaller programs. Finally, India and China, with their booming economies, are expanding their aid programs in a professed spirit of South-South cooperation, as well as to raise their international profile and expand access to natural resources and new markets for their goods.²⁶ Further, the increasing array of donors provides new funding opportunities for recipient countries and more leverage with traditional DAC donors and development banks. Recipients also find some non-DAC donors appealing because they do not place the same conditions on aid as do DAC members or large development banks.²⁷

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“New” Donors And The Push For Aid Effectiveness

In 2005 the international community endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which galvanized the push for increased country ownership, aid alignment, and donor harmonization.²⁸ As non-DAC donors—including China and India—increase their international aid, some critics are concerned that the proliferation of donors will undermine aid effectiveness, labor conditions, and environmental standards, and fragment efforts to harmonize donor practices.²⁹

The DAC sets standards that are supposed to increase the positive impacts of donor aid from member countries. For example, DAC discourages aid that is tied to goods and services from the donor country. DAC donors are supposed to place positive conditions on aid, including requirements for good governance, human rights and transparency, as well as environmental, labor, health standards.³⁰ Further, all DAC members endorsed the Paris Declaration principles, including being increasingly guided by recipient strategies and priorities, and committing to higher levels of collaborations with the partner country and other donors.³¹

These donor guidelines are highly criticized and are often ignored in practice. Recent studies of the Paris Declaration have found that the new guidelines exacerbate the power imbalance between donors and recipient countries and place greater reporting burdens on recipients, both of which undermine the goal of country ownership espoused in the Declaration.³² Furthermore, some argue that the Paris Declaration's emphasis on recipient country ownership is undermined by threats to sovereignty implicit in conditional aid extended by DAC members and multilaterals.³³ However, these standards are important because civil society groups and recipient country governments can hold DAC donors accountable to their positive aspects. And DAC reporting guidelines (discussed in the previous section) increase donor transparency and accountability.

While most non-DAC donor countries are officially listed as adhering to the Paris Declaration, supporting improved donor practices in their role as aid recipients, many do not follow these guidelines as donors. In Africa, for example, China offers substantial support in exchange for access to natural resources, contracts, and ending diplomatic relations with Taiwan, without conditions related to human rights and governance in the recipient countries.³⁴ This has led to fears among DAC countries that incentives to improve governance and human rights will be undermined by these new sources of funding. Further, some non-DAC donors provide “soft,” or low-interest loans to other countries, leading to concerns that formerly Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) that benefitted from debt relief will again borrow at unsustainable levels.³⁵

Country Study: India

As an architect of the non-aligned movement in the 1950s, which emphasized sovereignty, non-interference, and South-South cooperation, India has been active in aid donorship and knowledge transfer since the 1950s, particularly in the South Asia region. However, in the 2000s, India has shifted its foreign aid policies, both in terms of its role as a donor to other countries and how it receives aid from bilateral partners. While India's foreign aid funding is relatively small, it is increasingly tied to a package of economic and diplomatic advantages that can prove very valuable to other developing and transitional countries, as well as beneficial to India's own booming economy, just as in DAC countries.

Traditionally, India's foreign aid has focused on neighboring countries in South Asia, often in support of regional stability and countering the influence of neighboring Pakistan. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) scheme was initiated in 1964 and has provided training programs for 154 countries, focusing on South Asia and African members of the Commonwealth of Nations. The program focuses on training, project related activities, study tours, and provision of Indian experts. The program budget is \$11 million, which provides training for 3,000 people each year. India also

provides skilled personnel to multilateral organizations, as well as technical experts in various areas, while 55,000 Indians have worked as UN Peacekeepers.³⁶ India has also funded infrastructure projects in neighboring countries,³⁷ has been a contributor to the UN system's food program, and hosts a large number of refugees from Sri Lanka, Tibet, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. India's aid is predominantly bilateral, including a mix of low-interest loans and grants, and while it is more open about its aid than China, the lack of reporting standards make aid flows difficult to track.^{38 39}

In 2003, India's aid program entered a new phase as the finance minister outlined a new approach to foreign aid, explicitly in line with its own economic development and international profile. The India Development Initiative changed

India's role as an aid donor and recipient, announcing that India would no longer accept tied aid, and that it would accept bilateral aid from only five countries—the U.K., U.S., Russia, Germany, and Japan—and the European Union. Notably, these were not the five largest donors, as the Netherlands provided significantly more funding to India than the U.S. or the E.U. India encouraged the Netherlands and other former donors to provide assistance to NGOs, or channel their funding through multilateral organizations. The basis of selecting the five bilateral countries is unclear, but the Indian government seems to be more willing to accept aid from countries on the UN Security Council, and thus important international allies, and less likely to accept aid from countries that have scaled back aid or voiced significant disapproval over Indian affairs, such as the 1998 nuclear tests and the handling of communal violence in Gujarat in 2002.⁴⁰ India's new policies as an aid recipient led to a much publicized refusal of bilateral aid in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, in which India provided aid to neighboring countries, such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka, despite its own heavy losses.⁴¹ In addition, in 2003 the Development Initiative announced that India would pay off loans to all but four countries, would cancel the debt owed India by several heavily indebted poor countries in Africa and Latin America (including Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Guyana, and Nicaragua), and would increase grants and project assistance to developing countries in South Asia and Africa.⁴²

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These changes came in the context of increasingly large foreign reserves in India, as well as increasing requirements for new markets, raw materials, and energy in the expanding economy. India is highlighting development partnerships with countries with oil, raw materials, or with large Indian Diaspora populations, although it still focuses mainly on countries in the South Asian region. Bhutan has received significant ODA from India since the 1960s. Because of its status as an important buffer state between India and China, India has supported hydroelectric power projects in Bhutan that now provide energy for

India as well. India has provided military, economic and development aid to Nepal, and is significantly aiding Afghan reconstruction.”⁴³

As mentioned above, India does not report its development activities to the DAC, and does not classify and track funds in line with DAC standards, making it difficult to quantify aid volumes. Lines are blurred between development aid and foreign policy and trade interest. By one estimate, Indian aid amounted to \$300 million in 2006, but because India couches its aid in terms of investment and partnership rather than casting itself as a donor, it is inadequate to look at India’s ODA flows apart from the complete package of economic and political assistance to other developing countries. This report notes that “India is only a donor when it is also an investor, trade partner, or political ally, or can become one,”⁴⁴ a phenomenon that is not unique to India and applies to many more “traditional” donors as well. While this broader relationship can be positive for partner countries, some components of Indian aid have potential negative effects. For example, India refuses tied aid from other sources, but many of the grants and soft loans extended to other countries are tied to Indian goods and services.⁴⁵ Further, its emphasis on non-interference means that Indian aid is not conditioned on good governance or human rights records.⁴⁶

Country Study: China

China’s aid program is somewhat similar to India’s in terms of its long history of donorship and technical assistance, as well as ties between its foreign policy and its economic expansion and the subsequent need for new markets, energy, and natural resources. However, China’s investment and aid to other developing countries is much larger and more difficult to track than India’s, as China does not formally release its aid figures, let alone report them to the DAC. In 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao said that China had expended \$3 billion over the preceding 5 years. The U.S. treasury estimated that China gives \$500 million annually to North Korea while analysis of press reports suggests that it provides \$888.9 million to Asian countries, and \$800 million annually in grants and loans to Africa.⁴⁷ Its enormous foreign reserves and highly publicized relationship to the Sudanese government—problematic for public relations in the run up to the Beijing Olympics—have drawn international attention and criticism. A recent cover story of *The Economist* described China as “The New Colonialists,” a label China increasingly battles. However, while many aspects of China’s aid are deeply problematic, recipient countries perceive many benefits from partnership with a country with a track record of rapid economic expansion and monumental poverty reduction, and with a seat on the UN Security Council.⁴⁸

Like India, China has a longstanding policy of aid to other developing countries. China provided active support to independence movements in Africa in the mid-20th century, and provided various kinds of support for post-colonial reconstruction, including both technical training and capital intensive projects to build infrastructure.⁴⁹ China’s articulation

of an aid philosophy began in the 1950s, with support to India and the building of the Zambia-Tanzania railway. In 1964, then-Prime Minister Zhou Enlai articulated the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, and equal relations based on mutual benefit, solidarity and cooperation among developing countries, which continue to inform Chinese donorship, while Mao Zedong urged that as China developed, it should increase aid levels to help other countries do the same.^{50 51} Historically, Chinese aid projects focused on building self-reliance, such as training of foreign students in Chinese Universities, and agricultural and technical assistance, which were characterized by interest free loans and investment in projects that could be built quickly, including large stadiums in developing country cities. These programs were generally tied to use of Chinese construction companies and workers, and also had the stipulation of gaining support for the One-China Policy by requiring recipient countries to end their diplomatic relations with Taiwan.⁵²

Chinese foreign aid was shaped further by geopolitical struggles with the US in the 1950s and 60s, and with the USSR from the late 1960s to early 1980s. Aid rose as high as 6 percent of public expenditure, but was scaled back in the early 1980s, when China began receiving large amounts of ODA from other countries and focused on its own economic growth.⁵³

China's foreign aid program became more active again in the 1990s, contributing to an International Monetary Fund (IMF)-led relief effort for Indonesia in 1998 after the Asian Financial Crisis, contributing to major humanitarian aid for Afghan reconstruction in 2003, and contributing \$63 million in bilateral tsunami relief in 2006.^{54 55} Most Chinese aid has been bilateral in nature (although it has included contributions to UN agencies, including the World Food Program).⁵⁶ The country's aid structure is split between multiple ministries, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Commerce, and a regulatory framework for its aid has yet to be developed.⁵⁷ In contrast to policies earlier in the 20th century, Chinese aid now commonly takes the form of preferential loans, rather than the interest-free loans provided in the past, and there has been an increase in venture capital and business-to-business cooperation.⁵⁸ China has increased funding for large infrastructure projects. While loans are generally tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and services, there are usually no other conditions, such as environmental or social, attached.⁵⁹ China operates largely outside the DAC international donor community, but has increased its participation, including contributing to a DAC peer review of the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID).⁶⁰

While research found scant consideration of family planning and reproductive health in China's assistance, its aid program has long been involved in health sector work. China has been sending medical

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teams to other countries and building health centers since the mid-20th century. Twenty thousand Chinese doctors and nurses have been sent to Africa since 1963, and currently 1,100 are active on the continent.⁶¹ Then-premier Hu Jintao's 2005 pledge to increase aid also included plans to build and improve health centers, and China has pledged to provide anti-malarial drugs, as well as training for local health staff.^{62 63} More recently, China donated \$500,000 to Somalia through the World Health Organization (WHO) to expand access to health services and supplies to internally displaced persons.⁶⁴

Africa, Oil, and Chinese Aid

While China has traditionally offered large amounts of aid to Asian countries, - both the Chinese government and Chinese businesses have become increasingly involved in Africa over the last decade. Between 1994 and 2006, the China ExIm bank gave 259 loans to African countries, concentrating on Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique, Sudan and Zimbabwe, mostly for large infrastructure projects, including energy and mineral extraction as well as multi-sector transport, telecom, and water projects.⁶⁵ In 2003, Wen Jiabao announced debt relief of \$1.3 billion for 31 African countries and outlined plans for increased China-Africa cooperation, aid, and investment.⁶⁶ In January 2006, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that its contributions to Africa would be based on principles of peaceful coexistence, "sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development."⁶⁷ China announced that it would double aid to Africa, with a package including \$5 billion in loans and grants, \$5 billion for a China-Africa development fund, significant debt forgiveness, training of 15,000 Africans and increased scholarships for African students to study in China.⁶⁸ China purports to view African countries as partners for investment and not solely as recipients of aid, and does not criticize countries for internal human rights issues, nor refuse to partner with countries on that basis.⁶⁹

China's intensified engagement in Africa has been driven by the rapid growth of the Chinese economy and its need for energy.⁷⁰ The world's second largest energy consumer, China imports 25 percent of its oil from Africa, and is actively prospecting for oil in several African countries. Two-way trade with Africa totaled more than \$50 billion in 2006, with oil imports by China accounting for 60 percent of this trade; more than 800 Chinese companies are doing business in about 50 African countries.^{71 72} In return, however, China is accused of flooding African markets with inexpensive Chinese-made goods that are damaging to fragile African industries, such as the textile sector. China has taken some measures to rectify this, exempting some commodities from tariffs when importing from the 25 poorest African countries. This is a greater problem in countries that are not major oil exporters, and who are seeing huge trade imbalances with China. Further, the Chinese are criticized for using Chinese workers, both in their aid and in the companies working in Africa, when many positions could be filled by African workers, thus helping stimulate local economies.⁷³ For

example, while investing heavily in oil development in Sudan, China has been criticized for importing Chinese labor rather than hiring Sudanese workers.⁷⁴ This imbalance is not unique to China, and is a problem frequently linked with international trade. It is important that all countries, not just China or other emerging donors, implement beneficial trade policies, and not attempt to make up for harmful trade policies with foreign aid.

While increased aid flows are welcomed, many developed and developing country leaders alike are concerned about China's approach. The country will have to battle perceptions that its trade relationships are neocolonialist, and also defend its relationships with countries with records of corruption or human rights abuses, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. Lack of restrictions on its aid funding lead some to question whether aid funding is being used correctly, and if its benefits are trickling down past country elites.⁷⁵ Further, China's tied aid, such as using Chinese workers to implement construction projects, limits capacity-building in recipient countries. There is also little evidence of the use of benchmarks and evaluation in China's aid programs.⁷⁶ There are also legitimate concerns that Chinese aid and trade to Africa, mainly exploitation of natural resources, will prop up bad governments and provide funding for ongoing conflicts.⁷⁷ However, China's aid, with its limited conditions, is often quicker, less expensive, and more flexible to local conditions than Western aid. As such, China should be engaged and encouraged to be more open about its work and not be viewed solely as a threat.⁷⁸

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Recommendations and Implications for Reproductive Health

There are many potential benefits to having greater flows of funding provided by new donors, who bring different perspectives and experience from their own economic development. However, there is little evidence that emerging donor aid is currently helping to bolster lagging population funding. While funding for family planning and reproductive health is already difficult to track due to changing aid mechanisms, the most comprehensive source of data—UNFPA, UNAIDS, and NIDI's Resource Flows Project—“does not include... funds contributed by developing countries to be expended in other developing countries.”⁷⁹ Many of the emerging donors have particularly interesting experience with voluntary family planning programs, as declines in fertility rates occurred alongside their economic development. For example, in Thailand, the total fertility rate fell from 3.76 in 1975 to 1.85 today, while per capita GNI grew from \$350 in

1975 to \$3,050 in 2006.^{80 81} Of course, coercive policies, such as China's one-child policy, should not be exported. Still, many of the areas under the umbrella of reproductive health could be strengthened through Chinese investment and through lessons learned through the country's experiences in improving girls' education and maternal health.

The international community is still developing models of engagement with "new" donors like China and India, which can be used to promote investment in voluntary family planning and reproductive health. Multilateral engagement could take the shape of the World Food Programme's successful involvement with new donors. They have been particularly successful in engaging non-DAC donors by publicizing their contributions as a way to improve the donor country's image in the international press and their standing within the UN.⁸² Another potential method is through trilateral exchange, in which a DAC donor, a non-DAC donor, and a recipient country collaborate to develop and implement a program, allowing the countries to pool resources and develop capacity. This has considerable potential for increasing investment in voluntary family planning and reproductive health programs, but a brief by the German Development Institute advises that such an approach is most beneficial for engaging non-DAC donors that have made strides towards DAC standards. In contrast, they urge that countries such as India and China, are better engaged in dialogue surrounding good donorship, including inviting their participation in peer reviews of DAC projects.⁸³

As with most donors, such efforts must identify the benefits to the donor country for their investment in family planning and reproductive health funding. Multilateral contributions could increase these countries' international profiles, and investments in voluntary family planning programs in other countries could also counteract negative opinions of their own domestic population programs (although coercive programs do not deserve to be seen in a positive light). It could also counter accusations that emerging donors' aid programs are purely exploitative and profit driven. Regardless of the methods and motivations, as non-DAC country aid programs are likely to continue to grow and evolve in the coming years, it is important for the sexual and reproductive health community to engage with these donors to increase their funding for family planning and reproductive health programs, to build their capacity to implement programs, to challenge traditional donors to increase their funding, and contribute to improving the lives of women and their families in developing countries around the world.

Notes

- 1 DAC countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. OECD members that are not members of the DAC include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey.

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- member programmes.” Member countries also adhered to a norm of at least 86% for the grant element of ODA, and the “2001 Recommendation on Untying Aid to Least Developed Countries.” OECD. 2006. *Issue Paper: The DAC, Emerging Donors, and Scaled Up Global Aid*. Available from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/12/37823164.pdf>.
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